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We examine the consequences of transparency in an experimental multiple-dealer market with 
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true value. We vary both pre-trade and post-trade transparency by changing the way quote and 
trade information is published. The insider’s profits are greatest when price efficiency is 
lowest. Price efficiency, in turn, is reduced by pre-trade transparency and increased by post-
trade transparency. Market liquidity, measured by dealers’ bid-ask spreads, is improved by 
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1. Introduction 
Information is central to the structure and performance of financial markets. Indeed, a primary 
function of financial markets is to assemble and analyze information with the goal of accurate 
valuation of investment prospects. Asymmetric information is thus of obvious importance; the 
ability of financial markets to weigh and balance information from disparate sources and 
impound it in securities prices is basic to their function. The interactions among immediate 
participants – the brokers, dealers, market makers, and specialists directly involved in 
transacting on exchange floors and over-the-counter (OTC) networks – are crucial to a 
market’s ability to process information. We consider specifically the role of asymmetric 
information across dealers in an experimental multiple-dealer securities market. There are two 
broad issues at play here: the impact of asymmetric information on market performance and 
the impact of the institutional structure on information aggregation and dissemination. 
Regarding the former, it is well documented that the presence of asymmetric 
information has substantial effects on the performance of financial markets. The literature has 
largely focused on asymmetries among investors outside the trading floor. An important topic 
has been “insider trading:” the use (or abuse) of proprietary information by corporate insiders. 
This is the traditional definition of insider trading. We distinguish sharply, however, between 
such traditional corporate insiders and securities dealers who are better informed than their 
peers in a multiple-dealer environment. Although both are clearly examples of asymmetric 
information, the nature and implications of the asymmetries will typically differ between these 
two cases, as detailed below. 
The key issues regarding corporate insiders are fairness, price efficiency and market 
liquidity. For example, the Securities Exchange of 1934 in the U.S. effectively outlaws trading 
by corporate insiders as “unfair.” On the other hand, Leland (1992) argues that corporate 
insiders can bring new and relevant information into the market, making it more price-
efficient and future prices less volatile, as prices reflect more information sooner. However, 
frequent trading by corporate insiders can reduce market liquidity, as uninformed and 
liquidity-motivated investors trade less, due to their informational disadvantage. Thus, 
separate from the issue of fairness, a trade-off between efficiency and liquidity exists. 
Significantly, this trade-off is not the same in different market microstructures. For example, 
Leland (1992, p. 883), Pagano and Röell (1996, p. 581) and Schnitzlein (1996, p. 613) all 
conclude that any discussion of whether insider trading helps or hurts markets should take 
place in the context of a specific market microstructure or trading mechanism. Specifically, 
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the opportunities for the better informed to hide and exploit their private information – and 
thus the size and allocation of private and public gains from insider trading – depend directly 
on the trading mechanism.1  
In contrast, we focus on a microstructure that is relatively neglected in the literature, 
namely multiple-dealer markets. The nature of interdealer informational asymmetries is 
fundamentally different from those generated by corporate insiders. Interdealer asymmetries 
typically arise from information – such as private order flow or the rumor mill – that should 
already be impounded in prices in a semi-strong-form efficient market. On the other hand, the 
information available to corporate insiders should only be impounded in prices if markets are 
fully strong-form efficient. For example, Copeland and Friedman (1991), using an 
experimental double-auction study, place this question in the context of the rational 
expectations modeling literature. They distinguish theoretically between no, full, and partial 
revelation of expectations (NRE, FRE, and PRE, respectively), where NRE corresponds 
essentially to semi-strong-form efficiency, and FRE corresponds to strong-form efficiency.  
Their results are generally supportive of the PRE. Moreover, the potential social 
benefits of allowing insider trading – namely that it draws insiders into the market to reveal 
their information via trading – do not obtain as readily for dealers with insider information, 
since by definition dealers are already active in the market. 
There is thus some question as to the benefits of interdealer trade. If markets are not 
already semi-strong-form efficient, then interdealer trading can impound information from 
dealers’ private order flow, thus improving price quality. Moreover, in many markets, dealers 
may broker trades for corporate insiders, so that the dealer effectively becomes a surrogate 
corporate insider.2 Because microstructural rules concerning the publication of quote and 
transaction details may affect the revelation and aggregation of material information, the 
interaction between such rules and interdealer information asymmetries becomes an 
interesting theoretical and practical issue. For example, market makers on the Stock Exchange 
Automated Quotation (SEAQ) system in London have argued for delayed publication of the 
details of trades, ostensibly to encourage the provision of liquidity to investors for large 
                                                          
1  One example of a recent policy debate regarding asymmetries in this context involves the issue of “protected 
trading” on NASDAQ; see Franks and Schaefer (1995). 
 
2  Reviewing the extant evidence, Copeland and Friedman (1991, p. 265) note that, “all public information but 
probably not all private information is fully reflected in securities prices. The question then becomes when and to 
what extent private information becomes incorporated, or, from the opposite perspective, what is the value of 
private information to the investor?” (emphasis in the original). Notably, “private information” in their context 
would include private messages received by traders, analogous to interdealer information asymmetries. 
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transactions (see Flood, Huisman, Koedijk, and Röell (1997) – hereinafter FHKR (1997) – 
and Office of Fair Trading (1994)). Such publication delays create interdealer information 
asymmetries, allowing an affected dealer to unwind her resulting inventory before her 
competitors recognize her predicament. The informational question thus extends to issues of 
dealers’ inventories, risk bearing, and capitalization.  
In the present study, we consider the impact of rules concerning the publication of both 
transaction details (post-trade transparency) and live quotes (pre-trade transparency). These 
issues have been examined in other recent experimental work by Flood, Huisman, Koedijk, 
and Mahieu (1999) – hereinafter FHKM (1999) – Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), Lamoureux 
and Schnitzlein (1997), and FHKR (1997), among others. As emphasized by Glosten (1999), 
the issues and results in this area can be complex and counterintuitive. (The main theoretical 
issues are considered by O’Hara (1995), and Pagano and Röell (1996). FHKM (1999), 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), FHKR (1997), and Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997) 
consider the issues in an experimental context.) We focus here on the price discovery process. 
The obvious presumption would be that increased transparency should speed price discovery 
and therefore improve price efficiency. In the case of post-trade transparency, Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (1999) and FHKR (1997) find that this form of transparency (i.e., publication of 
transaction details via a public ticker or similar technology) indeed does speed price 
discovery. Notably, however, FHKM (1999) find that increased pre-trade transparency (i.e., 
the publication of live quotes) actually slows price discovery in a multiple-dealer market; their 
conclusion is that dealers in an opaque market will reprice more aggressively, to guarantee 
that they attract order flow. By contrast, in a fully pre-trade transparent market, in which all 
quotes are always public information, dealers can typically offer much smaller price 
improvements while nonetheless still guaranteeing that they are the best-price provider. 
Finally, Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997) find roughly that fully (pre- and post-trade) 
transparent markets are more price-efficient than fully non-transparent markets. We expect 
slower price discovery to benefit insiders at the expense of outsiders, as has been argued in the 
SEAQ case. 
Other aspects of the microstructure can affect the nature and extent of the trade-offs 
involved. In a theoretical paper, Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) examine 
relationships between specialists and floor brokers on major securities exchanges. Floor 
brokers occasionally broker trades from known corporate insiders, and may unilaterally hide 
or reveal this fact when they transact. Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) conclude that 
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reputation effects and lack of anonymity induce floor brokers to reveal private information to 
the specialist in exchange for anticipated long-run benefits of discretionary services from the 
specialist (e.g., tighter spreads, or a willingness to fill the remainder of orders partially filled 
against the book). Such a system can produce a Pareto-dominant equilibrium in which floor 
brokers get better service, the specialist faces lower adverse-selection risks, and prices are 
more informative. Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) suggest that non-specialist dealer 
markets such as NASDAQ are less likely to enjoy such benefits. Garfinkle and Nimalendran 
(1998) provide empirical support for this hypothesis. In the same vein, Madhavan and Cheng 
(1997) conclude that the “upstairs” market at the NYSE is used by traders who can credibly 
signal that they are liquidity motivated (and therefore do not have a special informational 
advantage), consistent with the theoretical predictions of Seppi (1990). 
We consider the interaction between informational transparencies in the trading 
mechanism and informational asymmetries among market participants. It is difficult to study 
the impact of microstructure on the consequences of asymmetric information using empirical 
data. Even if it were possible to identify asymmetries, it would still hardly be feasible to 
isolate the effects of the trading mechanism. We therefore adopt an experimental 
methodology, which places our study in a longer tradition of experimental studies of securities 
markets. Sunder (1995, pp. 447-48) provides a useful three-part classification of such studies. 
He groups papers as those considering: (1) the dissemination of information from the ex-ante 
informed to the ex-ante uninformed; (2) the market-wide aggregation of diverse ex-ante 
information sets in the hands of individual traders; and (3) the simultaneous equilibrium in the 
markets for securities and information (in an environment where information is produced 
endogenously). This taxonomy is especially apt, since the present study focuses likewise on 
the interaction of institutions and asymmetric information. Our study falls into the first 
category, and we are concerned not so much with whether our markets disseminate insider 
information, but rather how effectively they do so. In our experimental markets, there is no 
endogenous information production, while information aggregation occurs rather quickly, in 
the sense that price consensus (all dealer spreads overlapping each other) is readily – if 
imperfectly – enforced by arbitrage.  
Our study differs from most experimental double-auction studies (but not all; see, for 
example, Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (1982), and Plott and Sunder (1982)), in that our traders 
can both buy and sell the asset. Moreover, our dealers must act as market makers, providing 
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bid and ask quotes to other dealers at all times.3  
Our market framework is based on Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) model; it is a quote-
driven, continuous securities market in which five market makers trade a single imaginary 
security. We use three groups of professional securities dealers as experimental subjects.4  
The market makers set quotes and trade with each other and with computerized 
external customers. The latter are either informed traders or noise traders. In each trading 
round, one of the market makers is randomly chosen to be the “insider.” The insider knows 
the underlying value of the security. Since he is a market maker, he both trades and competes 
on price with the other market makers. In these experiments, we use the notion of pre-trade 
and post-trade transparency to distinguish between four different trading mechanisms. 
Following Pagano and Röell (1996), we define pre-trade transparency as the amount of quoted 
price information available to market makers, and post-trade transparency as the amount of 
transaction information available to market makers. We measure the relative private gains (in 
terms of insider profits) and public gains (in terms of speed of price discovery and size of 
dealer spreads) associated with various trading mechanisms when information asymmetries 
are present.  
 The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, we consider four different trading 
mechanisms in which we explicitly distinguish between pre- and post-trade transparency in 
our analysis. (Other studies examining insider trading in different trading mechanisms use a 
quite general notion of transparency; see, e.g., Pagano and Röell (1996), and Schnitzlein 
                                                          
3  The use of market makers – who must quote upon demand – as opposed to non-market-making dealers (who 
can both buy and sell, but may refuse to quote when asked), is relatively rare in experimental studies, although 
they are a central feature of most decentralized dealer markets in the real world. There is a large literature on 
experimental securities markets, and a full discussion of the issues is well beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Surveys of the literature may be found in Davis and Holt (1993), Duxbury (1995), Friedman and Sunder (1994), 
Plott (1982), and Sunder (1995), among others. 
 
4  Friedman and Sunder (1994, ch. 4) raise the possibility that student subjects may be preferable to professionals 
under some circumstances. Specifically, professional concerns, habits, and experiences may contradict trading 
procedures in the experimental market, and realistic payoffs (from the perspective of the research budget) may 
appear inconsequential to gainfully employed professionals. Although this is an important issue, we argue that 
does not significantly affect our current results. First, we have no indication, either from observing activity in the 
lab or during the formal post-experiment debriefing of the subjects, that our professional traders (who 
participated voluntarily) were not taking their task seriously or had failed to correctly understand their objectives 
and strategies in the experimental market. Moreover, in related research (essentially identical to the present study, 
but without an informed “insider” among the dealers), we conducted numerous student replications of our results 
from professional subjects. Although the students were clearly more likely than the professionals to request 
additional practice, to employ idiosyncratic trading tactics, and to ask basic questions about trading rules and 
procedures, the final results were always qualitatively the same. Regarding the magnitude of payoffs, our 
relatively small cash amounts are undoubtedly insufficient to induce the same sort of risk aversion that obtains in 
real securities markets. However, it is not clear that the use of student subjects would make the experiments more 
realistic in this regard.  
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(1996).) The distinction between price and transaction information is important, as the 
different types of information flows have different effects on market outcomes. It is also 
important in terms of inter-market competition, as competing exchanges worldwide 
implement trading mechanisms that indeed differ in the levels of both pre- and post-trade 
transparency.  
 Secondly, we use an experimental setting in which continuous trading is possible. This 
provides us with extensive time-series data: thousands of transactions and hundreds of quote 
settings for each of the trading mechanisms. Most experimental studies on microstructure 
have only a fraction of this available. Moreover, we use professional market makers as the 
subjects in our experiment. This is an important advantage over experiments using students as 
subjects. 
 Thirdly, we offer an alternative view of insider trading by giving the insider a different 
role than in most other studies (e.g., Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and 
O’Hara (1992), and Schnitzlein (1996)). Generally, the insider is regarded as an external 
customer submitting orders to the financial market. Market makers then compete for the order 
via their quoted prices, and the order is typically executed against the best price. In contrast, 
our insider is a market maker, competing directly on price with other market makers. (Lyons 
(1996), for example, examines the role of private order flow as a source of interdealer 
information asymmetries in a multiple-dealer market.) Our setup is closest institutionally to 
multiple-dealer financial markets such as NASDAQ, the London Stock Exchange, or the 
foreign exchange market.  
 We find an inverse connection between insider profits and the price efficiency of the 
market. Slow price discovery allows insiders greater opportunities to accumulate speculative 
inventories at advantageous prices. At the same time, however, we find that post-trade 
transparency (i.e., a public ticker) improves price discovery, while pre-trade transparency 
reduces price discovery. Consequently, post-trade transparency reduces insider profits, while 
pre-trade transparency increases them. Meanwhile, increased pre-trade transparency reduces 
dealers’ uncertainty and reduces market liquidity (as measured by bid-ask spreads), while 
post-trade transparency induces dealers to compete for private order flow, thus reducing 
spreads and increasing liquidity. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the experimental design and 
we introduce some terminology. Section 3 discusses the data obtained from the experiments 
and in section 4 we present some results. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes. 
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2. Experimental Design and Terminology 
This section briefly presents the experimental setup. Our goal is to investigate how the 
transparency mechanism affects the impact of asymmetric information on a financial market. 
More specifically, we examine price discovery (i.e., the convergence of dealer prices to the 
underlying true value), the distribution of profits, and bid-ask spreads. Our tests involve a 
computerized experimental securities market in which a number of human dealers (including 
one with an information advantage, referred to below as the “inside dealer” or simply the 
“insider”) trade continuously with each other and non-market-making customers. Trading is 
for a single imaginary security. 
 
2.1  Market Design 
Our experimental microstructure is essentially the continuous multiple-dealer version of the 
pure dealership market used by Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In their model, a specialist sets 
quotes and confronts investors who observe the quoted bid and ask prices and decide whether 
to trade (one unit at a time). The specialist is free to reset the bid and/or ask prices at any time. 
The investors represent both informed and liquidity traders and do not compete with the 
specialist, since they do not set limit orders in the market. Note that this market is quote-
driven, in the sense that the specialist first sets quotes and then confronts orders from traders. 
This is the main difference between our experimental design and Kyle’s (1985) order-driven 
framework. In the latter model, the quantities traded by both informed and liquidity traders are 
first batched, and the market maker then determines a market-clearing price. (See Madhavan 
(1992) for an overview of the differences between quote-driven and order-driven markets. The 
Kyle model is the underlying framework of the experimental market used by Schnitzlein 
(1996).) Our experimental design is thus most similar to the quote-driven experimental 
markets used by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), FHKM (1999), and FHKR (1997). There are 
two significant differences here, compared with the experimental design of Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (1999). First, our market makers both set quotes (required) and initiate trades 
(voluntary), thereby allowing for interdealer trading. Interdealer trading is a significant 
component of a number of important markets, including futures and options exchanges, the 
OTC stock market, and the interbank foreign exchange and money markets. Second, our 
market is continuous rather than sequential, in the sense that the dealers may trade and revise 
their quotes at any time during the round. The most important difference with FHKM (1999) 
and FHKR (1997) is that in their experiments there is no strategic, price-competing insider 
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present. Moreover, we consider pre-trade and post-trade transparency simultaneously. FHKM 
(1999) analyze the effect of pre-trade transparency when post-trade transparency is low. 
FHKR (1997) examine the impact of post-trade transparency when pre-trade transparency is 
low. 
 
2.2  The Role of the Dealers 
A priori, the security’s true (underlying) value is unknown to all human dealers but one. 
Before the start of each trading round all dealers receive a note. One of these notes has the true 
value printed on it, making the dealer who receives it the “inside dealer” or “insider;” the 
other notes have no information. The true value of the security can be seen as an ex post 
liquidation value as used in, among others, the Kyle (1985) and the Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) model. Each participant is the insider in either two or three rounds. All dealers are 
informed that there is exactly one insider in every round. The true value is revealed publicly at 
the end of each trading round. 
 At the start of each round, each dealer is given an initial endowment of 1000 esquires 
(a fictional numeraire currency). Dealers are instructed to maximize their end-of-round wealth 
by trading on the security. Wealth is expressed in esquires. Dealers can gain or lose wealth 
during each round by buying and selling the security (i.e., by jobbing) and by building a long 
or short inventory of the security (speculating). Dealers are not instructed about possible 
trading strategies, neither when they are the insider nor when they are an “outsider.” Each 
dealer trades according to his or her own expectations and predilections. If, at the end of the 
round, a dealer has a non-zero inventory position in the security, the trading software converts 
the inventory to cash (esquires) at the security’s true value, thus realizing any capital gain or 
loss on the position. 
 The true value is set at random and differs in each practice and session round (the 
values appear in tables 1-6). The true value in any round is unrelated to the values in any other 
rounds. In effect, trading in every round can be regarded as trading for a new security. Dealers 
are told only that the true value is somewhere between a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 
200. At the start of each round, the (non-insider) dealers do not have any prior information 
about the true value in that round, apart from the information that the price is uniformly 
distributed on the [1, 200] range. 
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2.3  Quoting, Trading, and Pre-trade Transparency 
At the start of each round, each dealer is obliged to enter a quote (that is, a bid price and an 
ask price) within 10 seconds. Dealers who fail to enter an initial quote within the first 10 
seconds are penalized at the rate of 10 esquires per second after that, until an initial quote is 
entered. Thereafter, every dealer always has a quote outstanding, at which the other market 
makers and the external customer can trade. (We use the terms “external customer” and 
“robot” interchangeably.) The maximum individual spread is limited to 30 esquires.5 
 The primary parameters in our experiments are the level of pre-trade transparency and 
the level of post-trade transparency. These parameters define our trading mechanisms. Both 
variables can assume one of two values: high or low. When the level of pre-trade transparency 
is high (we also refer to this as “full quote disclosure”), all outstanding price quotes appear 
continuously on the trading screen of each market maker. Bid and ask prices appear in 
separate queues in the center of the screen. Best prices are at the top of the queue; that is, bid 
(ask) prices are ranked from the top of the screen down in decreasing (increasing) order. Next 
to every price, the identity of the dealer who quoted this price appears, with the letters “A” 
through “E” indicating the five market makers, and “R” denoting the (non market making) 
robot. If at any time the bid (ask) price of several dealers is the same, then the most recently 
quoted price is at the top (i.e., strict price-and-time priority holds). An example of the trading 
screen appears in figure 1. A financial markets analogy is the basic NASDAQ retail trading 
screen. When a dealer opts to buy (sell), he automatically does so at the lowest (highest) 
quoted ask (bid) price.  
 When the level of pre-trade transparency is low (this situation is also referred to as “no 
quote disclosure”), no price information is publicly available. Instead, prices and transactions 
are communicated on a strictly bilateral basis. Dealers call each other to obtain price quotes. 
The dealer who receives a call does not respond actively. She does not even notice that she is 
being called; instead, her most recently quoted bid and ask prices automatically appear on the 
caller’s screen. Then, the caller has the option to buy, sell, or do nothing. The size of a trade is 
always equal to one. 
 
 
                                                          
5  This restriction is imposed to prevent dealers from effectively exiting the market by quoting infinite spreads. In 
practice, it was never binding. 
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2.4  Transaction Information and Post-trade Transparency 
A high level of post-trade transparency implies that there is full and immediate trade 
disclosure. That is, every dealer receives information about all transactions that have occurred. 
A financial markets analogy is a public stock ticker that reports the details of the day’s trades. 
The information appears in a transaction history window on the trading screen and consists of 
the identities of the buyer and seller, the transaction size (which always equals one share in 
our setup) and the price at which the transaction cleared. When the level of post-trade 
transparency is low, only transactions in which a particular dealer was involved are listed in 
his window. There is no delay in trade disclosure. 
 
2.5  Robot Behavior 
As mentioned above, the experiment involves two types of subjects. In addition to the five 
human dealers, there is a computerized (robot) trader in our market. This robot does not set 
quotes and cannot be called by the market makers. The robot represents an external customer 
of the securities market. The robot is programmed to trade every 7 seconds against the best 
prices in the market. Prior to each robot transaction, it is determined by chance whether the 
trade is an informed or an uninformed one. The noise level – i.e., the a priori probability, a, 
that a trade is informed – equals 0.5 in all rounds. At the start of the experiment, the dealers 
are told this probability. The dealers can therefore expect about half of the robot trades to be 
informed. Note that the market makers are never told whether a particular robot trade was 
informed or uninformed. However, given their knowledge of the probability that a robot is 
informed (a), dealers may be able to filter relevant price information by observing robot 
transactions.  
 If the robot initiates an informed trade, it buys (sells) if the lowest ask price (highest 
bid price) at that time is below (above) the true value of the security. The robot does not trade 
if quoted bid-ask spreads surround the true value. Note that the robot maximizes its expected 
profits only at the trade level; there is no dynamic strategy. Over the whole round the robot is 
restricted to trading only at multiples of 7 seconds. Since informed robot trades depend on the 
true value, these transactions contain direct information about the true value. If a robot 
initiates an uninformed trade, a binomial random draw (with probability one half) determines 
whether the robot sells or buys; if it sells (buys), it does so against the highest bid price 
(lowest ask price) available. Details of robot transactions follow the same post-trade 
transparency rules as interdealer transactions. As the identity of the robot is denoted with the 
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letter “R,” a robot trade that appears in the transaction history window is distinguishable from 
interdealer trades. 
  
2.6 Rounds and Parameters 
Together, the two experimental parameters – the level of pre-trade transparency (high or low) 
and the level of post-trade transparency (high or low) – are combined in a full-factorial design 
(i.e., using all four possible combinations). In addition, there are two nuisance parameters, 
namely the true value of the security, which changes each round, and the particular sequence 
in which the experimental variables are implemented.   
 We ran the experiments with three groups of human subjects. Each group of subjects 
traded in two “sessions” consisting of six five-minute trading rounds per session. To control 
for possible learning effects, the first group started with a session with no quote disclosure, 
and then moved on to a session of full quote disclosure; the second group, on the other hand, 
followed the opposite sequence. The third group followed the same sequence as the first 
(except that they completed only four rounds with each pre-trade transparency treatment). 
Within each session, post-trade transparency alternated between low and high from round to 
round. Each trading session followed two five-minute practice rounds, one in which the level 
of post-trade transparency was low and the other in which it was high. The practice rounds 
acquaint the subjects with the trading system and provide a chance to ask questions. In the 
“real” (i.e., the non-practice) rounds, subjects were paid for their results. The data reported 
here come from the real sessions. 
 At the end of each round, all dealers learn their final wealth. Esquires are translated 
into Dutch guilders according to the following payment scheme, which is explained to the 
dealers before the start of the experiment (1 USD » 1.75 NLG). In every round, 15 guilders 
are divided among all market makers, making this a fixed-sum game. Because the true value 
strongly influences the insider’s speculative profits, and because the insider has an 
overwhelming informational advantage, we adjust the final guilder payments so that they do 
not depend linearly on the insider’s esquire wealth, but rather on his wealth compared with 
other dealers. Specifically, if the insider fails to earn the highest esquire wealth, his guilder 
payoff is zero. Otherwise, he receives 6 guilders if his esquire wealth is more than three times 
that of the best outsider; 5 guilders if his esquire wealth is between two and three times that of 
the best outsider; and 4 guilders when his esquire wealth is between one and two times that of 
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the best outsider.6 What is left after the insider has been paid is divided among the other 
market makers according to their esquire wealth.  
 
3.  Data 
The data were collected from experiments held at the laboratory of the Center for Research in 
Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED) at the University of 
Amsterdam. The subjects in the first experiment, conducted on 27 January 1997, are five 
professional option traders from Optiver. In the second experiment, conducted on 3 February 
1997, five professional equity traders from ABN Amro Bank, de Generale Bank, and Oudhoff 
Effecten participated. These subjects acted as market makers in 12 independent rounds, 
divided into two six-round sessions. The third replication, involving five professional options 
traders from Amsterdam Options Traders, was conducted on 21 April 1999. Unfortunately, an 
operating system failure at the CREED lab forced us to abandon this set of replications before 
we were done. Eight rounds of usable data were produced, however. 
 Tables 1-6 present the settings in each round and some basic summary statistics. In the 
trading mode without quote disclosure we obtain, on average, 45 quote settings, 130 
transactions in which only outsiders (i.e., the four dealers who did not receive inside 
information) are involved, 180 transactions between the insider and an outsider, and 37 
transactions initiated by the robot. Disclosing quotes leads to more activity in the market. In 
the trading mode where quotes are disclosed there were, on average, 65 quote settings, 197 
transactions in which only outsiders are involved, 291 transactions between the insider and an 
outsider and 35 transactions initiated by the robot. These averages are taken over all three 
subject groups.  
                                                          
6  The purpose of this admittedly complex payoff scheme is to cap payoffs to the insider, to prevent the game 
from becoming a winner-take-all contest (which would disrupt risk-sharing among the dealers). Because the 
insider begins trading with such an extreme informational advantage, guilder payoffs to the four outsiders under a 
traditional linear payoff scheme would typically be minuscule. This creates incentives for risk-seeking behavior 
by the outsiders (e.g., speculating as heavily as possible on a random guess about the true value, in hopes of 
keeping pace with the insider); similar effects were revealed in pretests of the experimental software using 
student subjects. The three payoff buckets for the insider are intended to maintain an incentive for active trading 
at the margin. Note that this payoff scheme is not a classic “beat-the-market” tournament, in the sense of James 
and Isaac (2000). First, only the insider is singled out for a relative payoff rule. Second and more importantly, 
there is not a fixed exogenous distribution for the true value. Rather, the true value is non-random, and dealers 
are able to learn it in the course of trading, so that persistent price bubbles (rational deviations of quoted prices 
from the true value) are extremely unlikely, and indeed do not occur in our data. Lastly, we are comforted by the 
fact that our results appear to conform closely to the earlier results of FHKR (1997) and FHKM (1999), who use 
an affine payment scheme. 
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4. Results 
The following analysis examines the speed of price discovery, the level of insider profitability, 
and bid-ask spreads (as measures of efficiency, unfairness, and liquidity, respectively). We 
regard them as functions of pre-trade and post-trade transparency, and we consider the full-
factorial 2x2 matrix of transparency arrangements. We adopt a two-letter notational 
shorthand, in which the first letter indicates the pre-trade transparency treatment and the 
second letter indicates post-trade transparency. For example, “HL” indicates a high pre-trade 
and low post-trade transparency regime. The summary statistics aggregated for each 
transparency regime appear in table 7, and offer a preview of the more detailed results 
discussed below. Our results are consistent with the earlier work of FHKR (1997), Bloomfield 
and O’Hara (1999), Madhavan (1995), and FHKM (1999), who also examine price discovery 
in multiple-dealer experimental markets. However, neither of these earlier papers considers all 
four transparency combinations examined here, and neither includes an asymmetrically 
informed dealer. 
  
4.1 Price Efficiency 
In this section we concentrate on the effect of pre- and post-trade transparency on the 
informational efficiency of prices. In our experiments, information about the true value of the 
security is brought into the market via transactions of the informed robot trader and the market 
maker with inside information. As the expected flow of informed robot transactions is 
constant over the different trading regimes, differences in price efficiency should reflect 
differences in the transparency regime. As we show in the next subsection, these differences 
in price discovery have important implications for insider profitability: insiders profit more 
when price discovery is slow. 
 Following Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), FHKR (1997), FHKM (1999) and 
Schnitzlein (1997), we use price errors to measure the efficiency of the market. Our 
hypothesis on the effect of transparency on price efficiency is based on the results of, among 
others, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), FHKR (1997), and Pagano and Röell (1996). These 
studies find that increasing post-trade transparency leads to greater efficiency. The 
presumption would be that it is relatively hard for insiders to hide private information when 
transaction information is widely available to the non-insider market makers. In contrast, 
FHKM (1999) find a search-cost effect that causes increased pre-trade transparency to reduce 
efficiency in a multiple-dealer market. For simplicity, we state our null hypothesis to apply 
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equally to both pre- and post-trade transparency: 
H1: The decline of the price errors is faster in (pre- and/or post-trade) transparent 
markets than in less (pre- and/or post-trade) transparent markets, 
while acknowledging that low pre-trade transparency may behave counter intuitively. 
Figure 2 shows the average price error time path for each of the four trading 
mechanisms. We define price errors as the absolute difference between the average midpoint 
of all outstanding quotes and the underlying value of the security. Since the only ex ante 
information uninformed market makers have about the underlying value is that it lies between 
1 and 200, their best initial guess should be that the underlying value is around 100. This 
guess is reflected in the value of the price error at the beginning of each round, which is 
generally close to the absolute difference between the true value and 100. As shown in figure 
2 and the last panel of table 7, price errors clearly move towards zero after the first 20 
seconds, a pattern observed in all four trading mechanisms.  
Price errors decline as more information about the underlying value of the security is 
brought into the market. By definition, the better the market’s ability to transmit information, 
the faster price errors decline. While the average price error paths in figure 2 disguise 
considerable round-to-round variation in initial errors and convergence rates, the most and 
least transparent cases (HH and LL) appear to perform well relative to the others.  
This supposition is borne out by a more controlled statistical analysis. In table 8, we 
average price errors across all three groups and all rounds with a common transparency 
regime. Averages of dealer spread midpoints are taken at 50-second intervals throughout the 
trading round (plus an early reading after the first 20 seconds of trading), and are normalized 
by the starting error for the round. (The starting error is defined as abs(100 – TrueValue), 
since the expected starting quote for the uninformed dealers is 100.) Normalization 
compensates for differences in the true value of the security across rounds, allowing 
meaningful averages and comparisons. The bulk of price discovery occurs during the first 150 
seconds of trading, and the HH and LL regimes clearly outperform HL and LH over this 
interval. After 150 seconds, average price errors are over twice as large for HL (38%) and LH 
(36%) as they are for either HH (17%) or LL (15%). 
More formally, we estimate an individual effects panel model to examine the price 
efficiency in each of the four different trading mechanisms used in the experiments. (For 
details on estimating fixed individual effects panel models, see Baltagi (1995).) Thus, we 
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regress the price errors obtained in all 32 rounds on a constant, 32 individual-round dummies 
and four trend dummies. The dummy variables are included in order to isolate the effects of 
transparency. The estimated equation is: 
                     P I Itr r i
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trTrueValue r i r k t- = + = + = +
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                     (1) 
where t denotes time in seconds and r the trading round, Ptr is the average midpoint over all 
bid and ask quotes at time t, I(×) is a dummy variable for trading round and trading 
mechanism, and etr is an i.i.d. error term. Since dealers’ behavior changes after price discovery 
is achieved – trends in prices typically level off abruptly at this point – we discard 
observations after the point in time at which price errors have converged to a value less than 
or equal to five. Moreover, we omit the transactions completed in the first twenty seconds of 
each trading round in order to ensure that all market makers have submitted bid and ask 
quotes. OLS estimates for equation (1) are presented in table 9a. The third column shows the 
estimate of the intercept, while the estimates of the trading mechanism dummies are depicted 
in the fourth column. Larger negative values for the slope coefficient imply faster price 
discovery. The estimates of the 32 individual-round dummies represent differences in the 
underlying value in each round and the identity of the insider. They are omitted to conserve 
space. The coefficients for the dummies are generally significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the underlying value and the personal characteristics of the insider may 
influence market outcomes.  
 Table 9a generally confirms the conclusions from table 8, with the exception that the 
LL regime does not perform relatively as well in the regression analysis as it did in the more 
straightforward comparison of table 8. Table 9 thus largely supports hypothesis H1, that 
efficiency is greater when transparency is higher. The results show a clear ranking of the 
different trading mechanisms, although estimates of the slope coefficients in table 9a are not 
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significantly different from one another at a 5% level, as revealed in table 9b.7 The notable 
exception to the notion that more transparency is better is the least transparent microstructure 
(i.e., LL), in which efficiency is better than in the case with high pre-trade and low post-trade 
transparency (HL); this difference is marginally statistically significant. This result confirms 
the earlier work of FHKM (1999), who find that price discovery is faster under LL than HL; 
they argue that search costs can explain this counterintuitive result, as high pre-trade 
transparency sharply reduces the incentives for aggressive price improvements. The results of 
table 9 also confirm the conclusions of FHKR (1997), who find that price discovery is faster 
under LH than LL. Neither FHKR (1997) nor FHKM (1999) include an asymmetrically 
informed dealer in their experiments. 
 Lastly, we consider the implications of conditioning on only one of the transparency 
variables at a time. Row A of table 10 reports the results of estimating a modified version of 
equation (1), in which there are only two transparency dummies, based on the degree of pre-
trade transparency. In other words, the HL and HH rounds are pooled, as are the LL and LH 
rounds. The difference across coefficients for the pooled groups is marginally significant, and 
the search cost effect described by FHKM (1999) appears to dominate: price discovery is 
faster when pre-trade transparency is low. Similarly, row B pools the HL and LL rounds (as 
well as the LH and HH rounds) to examine the impact of post-trade transparency. In this case, 
the transparency effect described by FHKR (1997) seems to dominate, as price discovery is 
faster when post-trade transparency is high. This difference is also marginally statistically 
significant. 
 
4.2 Insider Profits 
The profits for the inside dealer are closely related to price efficiency in that round. A slow 
                                                          
7  Estimating equation (1) with transaction data rather than average spread midpoints yields larger (that is, more 
negative) slope coefficients for the low pre-trade transparency cases, and smaller coefficients for the high pre-
trade cases. Using transaction price data, the estimated slopes are: LL (-0.243), LH (-0.302), HL (-0.129), and 
HH (-0.232). The seemingly faster price discovery for the LL and LH cases is due to the fact that a significant 
minority of trades are made at off-market prices (a result of incomplete search by the dealer hitting the quote). 
Note that price trends become apparent in early trading, so that when prices trend upward (downward), the 
preponderance of dealers hit the asks (bids) of their peers. Meanwhile, we conjecture that the seemingly slower 
price discovery for the HL and HH cases reveals skewness in the typical distribution of quoted prices at a 
particular point in time. Recall that purchase (sale) orders go automatically to the best ask (bid) under high pre-
trade transparency. Thus, if prices are trending upward (downward), quoting dealers are more aggressive about 
keeping their ask (bid) off the market to avoid being hit. The result is greater dispersion in ask (bid) prices, 
creating a gap between mean and median prices overall.  
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convergence of price errors indicates that the propagation of information is slow. Although the 
insider’s speculative inventory strategy is essentially unchanged by faster price discovery, his 
ability to acquire inventory at advantageous prices diminishes more quickly. Hence insider 
profits should be relatively large when efficiency is weak, and vice versa. In the preceding 
subsection we found evidence favoring our hypothesis that the speed of price discovery is 
positively dependent on market transparency, with the exception that the least transparent 
regime (LL) performs relatively well in this regard, consistent with the search-cost effect 
reported by FHKM (1999). With this exception, then, we expect a generally inverse 
relationship between insider profits and transparency, since insider profitability should be 
inversely related to the speed of price discovery. This expectation is consistent with the 
conclusions of Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) and Pagano and Röell (1996). Hence, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Insider profits are lower in (pre- and/or post-trade) transparent markets  
than in less (pre- and/or post-trade) transparent markets. 
As with hypothesis H1, however, we acknowledge the caveat that increased pre-trade 
transparency (relative to the LL regime) may increase insider profits by reducing price 
efficiency. 
 In comparing insider profits across transparency regimes, we adjust the profits for the 
underlying value in the trading round. When the true value is extreme (i.e., far from 100), 
insiders are likely to make larger profits than when it is moderate. As this effect is not due to 
transparency differences, we normalize total insider profits by the absolute difference between 
the true value and 100 in each round. Moreover, we look at both average insider profits and 
average insider profits per transaction. Although it does not affect our conclusions, we regard 
the latter number as more meaningful, as the number of transactions differs substantially 
across trading mechanisms (search costs impose a logistical obstacle that reduces transaction 
rates substantially in the LL case). The penultimate section of table 7 presents insider profits 
(and average outsider losses) under each trading mechanism, averaged across all rounds. 
Unsurprisingly, outsider losses are closely related to insider profits. More importantly, insider 
profits are smallest in the most transparent market (HH), which was also the market in which 
price discovery occurred most quickly. Interestingly, however, the least transparent market 
(LL) shows similarly small insider profits, a fact consistent with its relatively speedy price 
discovery, established in the preceding subsection.  
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To test H2 more formally, we again estimate a fixed effects panel model in which we 
regress total profits per transaction in each of 32 rounds on four trading mechanism dummies. 
The model is given in equation (2):  
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where r denotes the trading round, pr is the average insider profit (either normalized by the 
number of transactions or non-normalized) in round r, I(×) is a dummy variable for trading 
mechanism and er is an i.i.d. error term. OLS estimates of equation (2) appear in table 11. 
Estimates of the 32 individual-round dummies are omitted from the table to conserve space. 
Again, we see that insider profits are lowest in the most transparent (HH) and least transparent 
(LL) cases. On the other hand, insiders are best off in the mixed-transparency cases (HL and 
LH). The pairwise differences in regression slope coefficients between the HH case and each 
of the two mixed-transparency cases (i.e., HH vs. HL, and HH vs. LH) are marginally 
significant. We conclude that insider profitability is inversely and causally related to the speed 
of price discovery in the market.  
As with price discovery, we also consider the implications of conditioning on only one 
transparency variable at a time. Table 12 reports insider profits averaged across each 
subsample of rounds. Row A of table 12 pools results based on pre-trade transparency, with 
the pooled LL and LH results in the first column, and the pooled HL and HH results in the 
second column. Row B similarly pools LL and HL (LH and HH) in the first (second) column. 
Although the standard errors are too large for either of the inter-column differences to be 
statistically significant, the pattern in the calculated averages fits neatly with the results in 
table 10. For the same two subsamples for which price discovery was relatively fast (i.e., low 
pre-trade and high post-trade; see table 10), we find here that insider profitability is relatively 
low. We confirm our conclusion that price discovery is the determining factor for our insider 
profitability results.  
In summary, the results for insider profits show a clear negative relationship between 
insider profits and the speed of price discovery, as anticipated. However, because the 
relationship between price discovery and transparency is a non-linear one, the relationship 
between insider profits and transparency is similarly non-linear. Specifically, although the 
highest-transparency regime has higher price efficiency and correspondingly lower insider 
profits than either of the mixed-transparency mechanisms (HL or LH), the least transparent 
regime (LL) also stands out with relatively high price efficiency and low insider profits. Thus, 
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the connection between transparency and insider profitability is not immediate, but rather 
makes its impact via the price discovery process. 
 
4.3 Spreads 
The spread between market makers’ bid and ask quotes is generally assumed to consist of 
three different components: order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs, and adverse-
selection costs. The first two components are nominally equal to zero in our experiments, and 
we focus on the latter.8 The standard adverse-selection component represents compensation to 
the dealer for losses to informed investors. However, a number of papers (e.g., Madhavan 
(1995)) argue that dealers in a multiple-dealer market should narrow their spreads in an effort 
to “purchase” informative order flow, with the goal of exploiting the resulting information in 
subsequent trading, a tactic that should be enforced by interdealer competition. Thus, adverse-
selection costs subsume both the degree of uncertainty in the market and the degree of 
(imperfect) competition. The existing literature also indicates that an explicit distinction 
between pre-trade and post-trade transparency is necessary when examining the relation 
between transparency and bid-ask spreads. Pagano and Röell (1996) find that the spread size 
decreases when more price information is available in the market. The argument is that 
uncertainty decreases when market makers know more about each other’s quotes. On the other 
hand, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) find that spreads increase when more transaction 
information becomes available in the market. Madhavan’s (1995) model concludes that 
market makers compete more fiercely when they cannot observe other market makers’ 
transactions, since in this case they must attract transactions to themselves to gain the 
information implicit in the order flow. We thus conjecture that reduced pricing uncertainty 
under pre-trade transparency should reduce spreads, while reduced competition under post-
trade transparency should increase them. We formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
H3: Bid-ask spreads are smaller in pre-trade transparent markets than in less  
pre-trade transparent markets. However, bid-ask spreads are larger in  
post-trade transparent markets than in less post-trade transparent markets. 
                                                          
8  Although there is no nominal inventory-financing cost in our experiments, dealer risk-aversion creates an 
implicit cost. However, the overriding source of risk for a (non-insider) dealer in our experiments is the adverse-
selection risk of a trade with an informed robot or dealer. Note also that a recent working paper by Flood, 
Huisman, Koedijk, and Lyons (1999) argues that search costs in multiple-dealer markets represent a fourth 
spread component that has not been fully recognized in the literature. 
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 Figure 3 shows the average spread size in each of the trading mechanisms, measured 
as the average bid-ask spread of all outside dealers in the relevant trading rounds.9 The initial 
spreads are high and similar in each trading mechanism, but spreads decrease as information 
is brought into the market over time. The spreads are nearly uniformly consistent with H3, 
which translates to the following four conditions: 
1. SLL > SHL 
2. SLH > SHH 
3. SHH > SHL 
4. SLH > SLL 
where Sk is the average spread size under trading regime k. For at least the first 230 seconds of 
trading, the average spread size is lowest when pre-trade transparency is high and post-trade 
transparency is low, indicating that uncertainty is relatively low and competition relatively 
severe. The reverse holds for the LH market, in which spreads are relatively large. The other 
predictions of H3 similarly hold in the data.  
In order to buttress the evidence in figure 3, table 13 presents the average outsider 
spreads pooled for all trading rounds with the specified transparency treatment. For example, 
row A of table 13 presents in the first (second) column the average outsider spread for all LL 
and LH (HL and HH) rounds. As predicted, increased pre-trade transparency narrows dealer 
spreads. Similarly, in row B, we see that increased post-trade transparency increases spreads. 
The predictions of H3 continue to hold under a finer-grained analysis. Thus, on average, SLL = 
23.9, SLH = 25.1, SHL = 20.1, and SHH = 21.1.10 Although neither of the inter-column 
differences in table 13 is statistically significant at the 5% level, hypothesis H3 is nonetheless 
clearly supported by the available evidence. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9  A naïve conjecture is that insider’s spread should differ systematically from those of the outsiders, since the 
adverse-selection incentives apply differently to the insider. However, the insider recognizes the obvious 
importance of concealing her identity. None of our spread results is changed markedly by including or excluding 
the insider. 
 
10  Moreover, insider spreads are not appreciably different from those presented in table 13. Recalculating the 
table with insider spreads, we get in row A (row B) SL* = 24.1 and SH* = 20.0 (S*L = 22.1 and S*H = 22.9), 
respectively. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
In recent years, market regulators and academic researchers worldwide have debated 
intensively about the implication and effects of asymmetric information on financial markets. 
Regulators have been particularly concerned with policies on insider trading, including both 
traditional corporate insiders as well as asymmetrically informed securities dealers. Numerous 
studies have investigate the costs and benefits of informational asymmetries for financial 
markets. In general terms, new information should enter the market as quickly as possible to 
improve the efficiency of market prices. On the other hand, the strategic use in trading of such 
an informational advantage can drive away the uninformed, and may therefore reduce market 
liquidity and the overall demand for securities. 
 In this paper, we follow the recommendations of Leland (1992), Pagano and Röell 
(1996), and Schnitzlein (1996), to examine the extent to which market microstructure affects 
the impact of asymmetric information on market performance. Specifically, we consider a 
multiple-dealer market in which one of the dealers begins with fundamental information 
unavailable to the other dealers. We vary two standard transparency rules as experimental 
variables: the pre-trade publication of dealer quotes (private information or broadcast) and the 
post-trade publication of transactions (public ticker or private information). The 
characteristics of the trading mechanism affect how difficult it is for uninformed dealers to 
detect an insider and infer his strategies; conversely, they affect the ability of the insider to 
exploit his informational advantage. 
 As it is extremely difficult to study insider trading empirically, we obtain our results 
from an experimental financial market, in which three groups of five professional securities 
traders act as market makers for a single imaginary security. The dealers set quotes and trade 
with each other and with both informed and liquidity-motivated clients. In each 5-minute 
experimental trading round, one of the dealers receives (inside) information about the true 
value of the security. We create four different trading mechanisms by varying the two 
transparency rules. An important innovation is that we model the insider as a market maker in 
a multiple-dealer market, while most other studies consider an informed external investor. 
This is relevant, since dealers in multiple-dealer markets will typically have inside 
information via their private order flow, if not from other sources as well. Moreover, when a 
limit order book is present, external customers are also able to compete on price to a limited 
degree. 
 We obtained our data from a series of 5-minute trading rounds for three groups of 
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subjects. Our results clearly indicate an inverse connection between insider profits and the 
price efficiency of the market. Slow price discovery allows insiders greater opportunities to 
accumulate speculative inventories at advantageous prices. However, the connection between 
insider profitability and transparency is somewhat more complex, because the connection 
between transparency and price efficiency is non-linear. Post-trade transparency (i.e., a public 
ticker) improves efficiency. Conversely, however, and consistent with the earlier work of 
FHKM (1999), pre-trade transparency in our multiple-dealer market slows price discovery, 
thus increasing insider profitability. Market liquidity, measured by average dealer bid-ask 
spreads, behaves consistently with theoretical predictions. Increased pre-trade transparency 
reduces dealers’ uncertainty and reduces spreads. On the other hand, eliminating post-trade 
transparency creates an incentive for dealers to compete for private order flow, thus reducing 
spreads. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of the trading rounds without quote disclosure for the first 
group of subjects. 
 
Group 1  
session 1: no quote disclosure 
 
Round no. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Settings 
 
      
Post-trade 
transparency 
L H L H L H 
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
True value 61 44 152 186 19 151 
       
Results 
 
      
# Quotes set 38 35 50 61 69 40 
# Trades       
 Total 
 Outsiders 1 
 Insider 2 
 Robot 
315 
149 
132 
34 
442 
180 
220 
42 
121 
44 
44 
33 
199 
53 
105 
41 
279 
125 
116 
38 
328 
80 
215 
33 
Avg. dealer spreads 
 Outsiders  
 Insider  
 
29 
24 
 
26 
30 
 
26 
22 
 
27 
25 
 
23 
24 
 
27 
23 
       
Average end-of-round capital 3  
 
Dealers 
 Outsiders 
 – Std. deviation 
 
Insider 
 
 
-430 
(870)  
 
1733 
 
-945 
(2401) 
 
3410 
 
-95 
(450) 
 
203 
 
-1265 
(1938) 
 
4408 
 
-1175 
(2283) 
 
4085 
 
-451 
(179) 
 
1848 
1 Trades in which only (human) outsiders are involved. 
2 Trades in which the insider is involved. 
3 Expressed in esquires and excluding the initial amount of capital. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of trading rounds with quote disclosure for the first group of 
subjects. 
 
Group 1 
session 2: quote disclosure 
 
Round no. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Settings 
 
      
Level of post-trade 
transparency 
L H L H L H 
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
True value 186 81 134 64 49 165 
       
Results 
 
      
# Quotes set 91 74 87 78 98 61 
# Trades       
 Total 
 Outsiders 1 
 Insider 2 
 Robot 
673 
351 
280 
42 
518 
252 
238 
28 
638 
247 
363 
28 
816 
322 
453 
41 
664 
213 
412 
39 
652 
165 
449 
38 
Avg. dealer spreads 
 Outsiders  
 Insider  
 
15 
30 
 
17 
12 
 
13 
23 
 
25 
19 
 
21 
26 
 
18 
12 
       
Average end-of-round capital 3 
 
Dealers 
 Outsiders 
 – Std. deviation 
 
Insider 
 
 
-4089 
(3740) 
 
15041 
 
-133 
(134) 
 
504 
 
-417 
(484) 
 
1719 
 
708 
(3173) 
 
-3124 
 
-2431 
(3577) 
 
8789 
 
-660 
(1543) 
 
2557 
1 Trades in which only (human) outsiders are involved. 
2 Trades in which the insider is involved. 
3 Expressed in esquires and excluding the initial amount of capital. 
 
 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of trading rounds without quote disclosure for the second group 
of subjects. 
 
Group 2 
session 2: no quote disclosure 
 
Round no. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Settings 
 
      
Level of post-trade 
transparency 
L H L H L H 
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
True value 61 44 152 186 19 151 
       
Results 
 
      
# Quotes set 38 42 41 36 45 44 
# Trades       
 Total 
 Outsiders 1 
 Insider 2 
 Robot 
289 
121 
134 
 34 
551 
228 
281 
 42 
330 
154 
141 
35 
558 
306 
210 
 42 
324 
114 
169 
41 
337 
104 
202 
31 
Avg. dealer spreads 
 Outsiders  
 Insider  
 
22 
15 
 
23 
30 
 
23 
23 
 
27 
27 
 
26 
28 
 
24 
23 
       
Average end-of-round capital 3 
 
Dealers 
 Outsiders 
 – Std. deviation 
 
Insider 
 
 
-324 
(949) 
 
1358 
 
-1961 
(4406) 
 
7698 
 
-549 
(1673) 
 
2015 
 
-3764 
(12243) 
 
13118 
 
-1003 
(1722) 
 
3521 
 
-594 
(1679) 
 
2139 
1 Trades in which only (human) outsiders are involved. 
2 Trades in which the insider is involved. 
3 Expressed in esquires and excluding the initial amount of capital. 
 
 
Table 4 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of trading rounds with quote disclosure for the second group of 
subjects. 
 
Group 2 
session 1: quote disclosure 
 
Round no. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Settings 
 
      
Level of post-trade 
transparency 
L H L H L H 
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
True value 186 81 134 64 49 165 
       
Results 
 
      
# Quotes set 39 57 56 40 45 52 
# Trades       
 Total 
 Outsiders 1 
 Insider 2 
 Robot 
580 
178 
359 
43 
501 
265 
205 
31 
398 
135 
237 
26 
514 
155 
326 
33 
449 
163 
248 
38 
748 
283 
426 
39 
Avg. dealer spreads 
 Outsiders  
 Insider  
 
23 
26 
 
25 
23 
 
24 
17 
 
25 
16 
 
22 
14 
 
20 
29 
       
Average end-of-round capital 3 
 
Dealers 
 Outsiders 
 – Std. deviation 
 
Insider 
 
 
-6334 
(10157) 
 
24902 
 
-371 
(976) 
 
1565 
 
-365 
(561) 
 
1539 
 
-733 
(753) 
 
2834 
 
-543 
(1045) 
 
2127 
 
-1376 
(4146) 
 
5239 
1 Trades in which only (human) outsiders are involved. 
2 Trades in which the insider is involved. 
3 Expressed in esquires and excluding the initial amount of capital. 
 
 
Table 5 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of trading rounds without quote disclosure for the third group 
of subjects. 
 
Group 3 
session 1: no quote disclosure 
 
Round no. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Settings 
 
    
Level of post-trade 
transparency 
L H L H 
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
True value 61 44 152 186 
     
Results 
 
    
# Quotes set 48 47 49 45 
# Trades     
 Total 
 Outsiders 1 
 Insider 2 
 Robot 
118 
67 
24 
27 
513 
137 
334 
42 
209 
96 
72 
41 
638 
116 
486 
36 
Avg. dealer spreads 
 Outsiders  
 Insider  
 
21 
10 
 
23 
27 
 
21 
28 
 
24 
26 
       
Average end-of-round capital 3  
 
Dealers 
 Outsiders 
 – Std. deviation 
 
Insider 
 
 
-59 
(250) 
 
205 
 
-1572 
(2773) 
 
5742 
 
-510 
(1145) 
 
1578 
 
-3348 
(2038) 
 
12530 
1 Trades in which only (human) outsiders are involved. 
2 Trades in which the insider is involved. 
3 Expressed in esquires and excluding the initial amount of capital. 
 
 
Table 6 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of trading rounds with quote disclosure for the third group of 
subjects. 
 
Group 3 
session 2: quote disclosure 
 
Round no. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Settings 
 
    
Level of post-trade 
transparency 
L H L H 
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
True value 186 81 134 64 
     
Results 
 
    
# Quotes set 49 72 72 65 
# Trades     
 Total 
 Outsiders 1 
 Insider 2 
 Robot 
371 
159 
182 
30 
179 
86 
66 
27 
458 
83 
340 
35 
200 
91 
69 
40 
Avg. dealer spreads 
 Outsiders  
 Insider  
 
20 
21 
 
18 
18 
 
23 
25 
 
21 
9 
       
Average end-of-round capital 3  
 
Dealers 
 Outsiders 
 – Std. deviation 
 
Insider 
 
 
-1169 
(2346) 
 
4367 
 
 
-216 
(267) 
 
853 
 
 
-848 
(1373) 
 
3296 
 
 
-88 
(532) 
 
275 
 
1 Trades in which only (human) outsiders are involved. 
2 Trades in which the insider is involved. 
3 Expressed in esquires and excluding the initial amount of capital. 
 
 
Table 7 
Summary Statistics for Each Trading Mechanism 
 
In this table, the summary statistics for individual rounds depicted in tables 3.1 through 3.6 are 
averaged over all three groups and eight rounds to obtain summary statistics for the four trading 
mechanisms. 
 
 Variable LL LH HL HH 
Number of quotes set 47.3 43.8 67.2 62.4 
Number of trades 
  Total 
  Outsiders 
  Insider 
  Robot 
 
248.1 
108.8 
104.0 
35.4 
 
445.8 
150.5 
256.6 
38.6 
 
528.9 
191.1 
302.6 
35.1 
 
516.0 
202.4 
279.0 
34.6 
Average dealer spreads 
  Outsiders  
  Insider  
 
23.9 
21.8 
 
25.1 
26.4 
 
20.1 
22.8 
 
21.1 
17.3 
Average end-of-round capital 
  Outsiders 
 Insider 
 
- 518.1 
1837.3 
 
- 1737.5 
6361.6 
 
- 2024.5 
7722.5 
 
- 358.6 
1337.9 
Price discovery 
  Time to convergence 1 
 Percentage price error 2  
  after 100 seconds 
  after 200 seconds 
  after 300 seconds 
 
185.8 
 
0.39 
0.12 
0.06 
 
241.3 
 
0.57 
0.23 
0.09 
 
138.6 
 
0.39 
0.32 
0.18 
 
105.5 
 
0.32 
0.15 
0.14 
1  Average number of seconds until the average quote midpoint for all dealers has converged to less 
than 5 esquires away from the underlying true value. 
2  Average price error after t seconds, divided by the average price error after 20 seconds. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Normalized Price Errors in Different Trading Mechanisms 
 
This table presents normalized price errors for four different transparency regimes. The normalized 
price errors are based on the absolute difference between the true value of the security in each round 
and the average midpoint of all outstanding quotes. These errors are then averaged over eight rounds 
in order to obtain the average price errors for each different trading mechanism. The resulting 
numbers are corrected for the average initial price error in each transparency regime, to obtain price 
errors that are directly comparable across trading mechanisms. The initial price error is defined as 
abs(100 - TrueValue). 
 
Time  
(in seconds) 
LL LH HL HH 
50 0.58 0.78 0.65 0.48 
100 0.33 0.56 0.44 0.25 
150 0.15 0.36 0.38 0.17 
200 0.11 0.22 0.35 0.13 
250 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.14 
300 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.11 
 
 
 
Table 9a 
Price Efficiency 
 
This table presents the estimated intercept and the coefficients of the trading mechanism dummies 
from the fixed effects panel model depicted in equation (3.1). Robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. Significance at the 5% level is denoted by *. The number of data points is 4535. The R-
squared of the regression is equal to 0.756.  
 
 Pre-Trade  
Transparency 
Post-Trade 
Transparency 
Estimated Intercept 
Estimated Slope 
Coefficient 
LL low low   
- 0.207* 
 (0.030) 
LH low high 
b0: 57.72* 
(2.449) 
- 0.228* 
 (0.034) 
HL high low   
- 0.138* 
 (0.021) 
HH high high   
- 0.317* 
 (0.141) 
 
 
 
 
Table 9b 
Matched Pair Tests of Transparency Effect on Price Efficiency 
 
This table presents the implications of changing the level of pre-trade and post-trade transparency on 
the price efficiency in the market. The effects of pre-trade and post-trade transparency on price 
efficiency are computed using the coefficients for the trading mechanism dummies in equation (3.1). 
The standard errors depicted in this table are robust to heteroskedasticity. None of the effects is 
statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Invariable  
Transparency 
Transparency Effect 
Trading 
Mechanisms 
Effect on Estimated Slope 
low post-trade 
transparency 
pre-trade LL vs. HL 
0.069 
(0.038) 
high post-trade 
transparency 
pre-trade LH vs. HH 
- 0.089 
(0.145) 
low pre-trade  
transparency 
post-trade LL vs. LH 
- 0.021 
(0.041) 
high pre-trade  
transparency 
post-trade HL vs. HH 
- 0.179 
(0.141) 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Pooled Effects of Pre-Trade and Post-Trade Transparency on Efficiency 
 
In the fixed effects panel model depicted in the first row (case A) of this table, LL and LH rounds are 
pooled (first column), as are HL and HH (second column), to examine the effect of conditioning 
solely on pre-trade transparency. In the second row (case B), LL and HL are pooled, as are LH and 
HH for a similar analysis of the effect post-trade transparency. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance at the 5% level is denoted by *. The differences between low-transparency 
and high-transparency estimates are not significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
in either case A or B. The number of data points is 4535. The R-squared of regression A (B) is equal 
to 0.748 (0.750). 
 
Regression 
Estimated 
Intercept 
Slope Estimate  
Low Transparency 
Slope Estimate  
High Transparency 
A: pre-trade 
transparency 
57.053* 
(2.162) 
- 0.221* 
(0.023) 
- 0.160* 
(0.026) 
B: post-trade 
transparency 
57.146* 
(2.400) 
- 0.170* 
(0.021) 
- 0.235* 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
Table 11a 
Insider Profits 
 
This table depicts the fixed effects panel coefficients for the trading mechanism dummies in equation 
(3.2). For the first column, pr is the coefficient on total insider profits; for the second column, pr is the 
coefficient on total insider profits divided by the total number of insider transactions. The data is 
pooled over 32 rounds. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance at the 5% level is 
denoted by *. The number of observations is equal to 32. The R-squared amounts to 0.301 for the raw 
profits and 0.119 for the profits per transaction. 
 
Pre-Trade 
Transparency 
Post-Trade 
Transparency 
Raw Profits 
Profits per  
Transaction 
low low  
31.43* 
(20.84) 
0.2657* 
(0.0704) 
low high 
91.07* 
(20.84) 
0.3608* 
(0.0704) 
high low 
115.25* 
(20.84) 
0.3554* 
(0.0704) 
high high 
34.16* 
(20.84) 
0.1957* 
(0.0704) 
 
 
 
Table 11b 
Matched-Pair Tests of the Effect of Transparency on Insider Profits 
 
This table presents the implications of changing the level of pre-trade and post-trade transparency on 
the insider profits. The effects of pre-trade and post-trade transparency on insider profits per 
transaction are computed using the coefficients for the trading mechanism dummies in equation (3.2). 
The standard errors depicted in this table are robust to heteroskedasticity. None of the effects is 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
 
Invariable  
Transparency 
Transparency Effect 
Trading 
Mechanisms 
Effect on Estimated 
Intercept 
low post-trade 
transparency 
pre-trade LL vs. HL 
0.090 
(0.100) 
high post-trade 
transparency 
pre-trade LH vs. HH 
- 0.165 
(0.100) 
low pre-trade  
transparency 
post-trade LL vs. LH 
0.095 
(0.100) 
high pre-trade  
transparency 
post-trade HL vs. HH 
- 0.160 
(0.100) 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Effects of Pre-Trade and Post-Trade Transparency on Average Profits 
 
This table presents the effect of transparency on insider profits by averaging the insider profits over 
two different transparency regimes. In the first row (case A), average insider profits in LL and LH 
rounds are computed (first column), as are HL and HH (second column), to examine the effect of 
conditioning solely on pre-trade transparency. In the second row (case B), average insider profits in 
LL and HL are calculated, as are LH and HH for a similar analysis of the effect post-trade 
transparency. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
Transparency Variable 
Average  
Low Transparency 
Average  
High Transparency 
A: pre-trade transparency 
4099 
(3933) 
4530 
(6784) 
B: post-trade transparency 
4780 
(6524) 
3850 
(4309) 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Effects of Pre and Post-Trade Transparency on Average Spreads 
 
This table presents the effect of transparency on dealer spreads by averaging the spreads over two 
different transparency regimes. In the first row (case A), average outsider spreads in LL and LH 
rounds are computed (first column), as are HL and HH (second column), to examine the effect of 
conditioning solely on pre-trade transparency. In the second row (case B), average outsider spreads in 
LL and HL are calculated, as are LH and HH for a similar analysis of the effect post-trade 
transparency. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
Transparency Variable 
Average  
Low Transparency 
Average  
High Transparency 
A: pre-trade transparency 
24.5 
(2.39) 
20.6 
(3.65) 
B: post-trade transparency 
22.0 
(3.88) 
23.1 
(3.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Trading Screen 
 
This figure depicts an example of a trading screen in the market without quote disclosure. Each dealer 
has her own trading screen. The window on the left presents the cash balance (790 esquires), this 
dealer’s inventory (2 shares long), this dealer’s outstanding quote of (90 - 110), and this dealer’s 
approximate profit, based on the price of the last transaction in which she was involved (1010 
esquires). The window also shows the time remaining in this round. When this dealer calls another 
dealer, bid and ask quotes appear in the center window. In the heading of this window, “ID” denotes 
the identity of the quoting dealer, “Sell” denotes the quoted bid (at which this dealer can sell), and 
“Buy” denotes the quoted ask (at which this dealer can buy). In the market with full quote disclosure 
where all quotes are disclosed publicly, all bids are presented below “Sell” ranked from highest to 
lowest and all asks are presented below “Buy” ranked from lowest to highest. Information on past 
transactions appears at the right of the trading screen. By default, it displays the details of the last 20 
transactions; the dealer can scroll through the list with the PageUp and PageDown keys. For all 
transactions, the identities of the buying (under heading “buy”) and the selling (“sel”) dealer are 
displayed, along with the number of shares traded and the transaction price. For example, the first row 
indicates that this dealer (his identity is depicted by *) bought one share for 100 esquires from dealer 
B. The five dealers’ identities are denoted by letter ranging from “A” through “E”. The robot is 
denoted with the letter “R”. The fourth transaction is thus an example of a trade in which the robot 
sold one share to this dealer for 110 esquires. 
 
*   B
D   *
*   A
*   R
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Price Errors 
 
This figure shows the average price errors for each combination of transparency variables; e.g. “low, 
high” refers to low pre-trade and high post-trade transparency. Price errors are defined as the absolute 
difference between the true value of the security and the average midpoint of outstanding quotes. The 
price errors are averaged across all rounds with the specified combination of transparency variables. 
The first 20 seconds of each round are omitted, to allow time for all dealers to submit their first 
quotes. 
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Figure 3 
Dealer Spreads 
 
This figure shows the average outsider spreads in the four different microstructures for all three 
groups of subjects. The average spread in each trading round is defined as the average size of the 
spread between the bid and ask quotes of all market makers. The lines in this graph were constructed 
by averaging the spreads of 8 individual rounds with the same trading mechanism. The first 20 
seconds of each trading round were omitted from the calculation, as dealers used this time period to 
enter their first bid and ask quotes. 
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